Claremont Journal of Law and Public Policy / March 23, 2018
By Wesley Whitaker (CMC ’18)
译者按：加州是否修改宪法取消209法案的争议越演越烈。本文作者可以看出是反对209的，因为文章有明显的倾向性。不过写的209法案从开始的一个想法到最后公投成功后面的历史背景和过程，对今天的现实也很有参考价值。强烈推荐关心按肤色搞特殊照顾政策的朋友读读。
90年代的209法案成败的核心基于一个深度的民意调查。发起者密切注意围绕平权行动的用词和公众观点的民意调查数据。他们的发现非常惊人：对平权行动计划的支持根据问题的措辞有大幅度的波动。一项民意调查发现：当在不使用配额系统的情况下询问是否会支持平权行动时，75%的调查对象表示支持，其中包括白人中的71%。然而当问到他们是否会支持比起同等资格的白人对少数族裔候选人给予基于种族的优待的系统时，72%的白人调查对象和42%的黑人调查对象给出了负面答案。
所以大概结论是：公投关键看双方用哪种措辞来赢得选民的选票。
Introduction
介绍
While discussions of affirmative action typically revolve around the decisions of the Supreme Court, the battle for affirmative action in California played out over the airways and door to door, rather than in a courtroom. The first major piece of civil rights legislation to be voted on by the public, Proposition 209 was approved by a majority of California voters in 1996 after a long, tumultuous campaign. Proposition 209 amended the state constitution to prohibit state governmental institutions from considering race, sex, or ethnicity, specifically in the areas of public employment and university admissions. Curiously though, public opinion polling showed overall support among Californians for policies that took race into consideration during hiring for example. The framing of the issue, then, as a preference for minority candidates over whites was the driving factor in the campaign’s success. As an amendment to the state constitution, only by passing another constitutional amendment through the initiative process can Proposition 209 be repealed. Thus, affirmative action policies are extremely unlikely to return to public institutions in California.
尽管关于平权行动的讨论通常围绕着最高法院的裁决进行，加州的平权行动之战是在空中以及门对门进行的，而不是在法庭上进行的。作为待公众投票的民权立法里的首个主要项，209号法案在漫长、动荡的运动后于1996年被加州大多数选民批准。209号法案修正了州宪法，禁止州政府机构考虑种族、性别或族群，特别是在公务雇用和大学录取方面。不过令人好奇的是，公众观点民意调查显示了加州人总体上对在例如招聘期间考虑种族因素的政策予以支持。当时该问题被定为相比于白人，给少数族裔族裔群体候选人特殊优待，这是运动获得成功的驱动因素。作为州宪法的修正案，只有通过发起过程通过另一项宪法修正案，才能废除209号法案。因此，平权行动政策几乎不可能返回到加州的公共机构了【译者按：本文写于2018，作者没有想到2020会再次同一话题进行公投】。
Turbulent Economic Conditions Bring Tense Political Climate
动荡的经济形势带来紧张的政治气氛
The first half of the 1990s was marked by extreme economic volatility and uncertainty in California. While California’s economy had been outpacing the national economy, highlighted by stellar personal income and employment growth, the early 1990s recession hit California harder than the rest of the nation and the recovery was much slower.[1] For example, personal income growth in California from 1990 to 1994 was about half of the national rate — 12 percent compared to 22 percent. In 1994, there were actually less jobs than in 1990 and unemployment peaked at nearly 10 percent in October of 1992.[2] One of the driving factors of the lagging recovery was the loss of manufacturing jobs in the aerospace industry due to a decline in federal defense spending. The housing sector was hit hard by the recession as well. The number of new residential building permits fell to only 85,000 in 1993, the lowest in over 25 years on a per capita basis, compared to an average of 210,000 new residential building permits during the 1970s and 1980s.[3]
20世纪90年代上半叶加州的表现为极端的经济动荡和不确定性。虽然加州的经济一直领先于全国经济，亮点尤为一流的个人收入和就业增长，90年代早期的经济衰退对加州的打击比对全国其它各地的打击都要大，而恢复却缓慢许多。[1] 例如，加州的个人收入增长在1990年到1994年里大概是全国增长率的一半——其增长率为12%，相比之下全国增长率为22%。1994年的工作岗位实际上比1990年的少，而失业率在1992年10月达到顶峰，接近10%。[2] 滞后的经济恢复的驱动因素之一是联邦防御支出减少导致的航空航天领域里的制造业工作岗位丢失。住房业也受到经济衰退的重击。新居民建筑许可证数在1993年跌至仅为85000个，与70年代和80年代平均有210000个新居民建筑许可证相比，这是25年来人均数最低的一次。[3]
On top of a struggling economy, California’s population grew rapidly in preceding decades and showed little signs of slowing down. Since 1970, the state’s population grew by over 10 million, bringing the total population in 1990 to just under 30 million.[4] The population boom had also significantly changed the demographic makeup of the state as international immigration accounted for most of the new residents in the states after 1970, primarily from Latin American and Asian countries. This demographic shift was reflected across the state as those relying on public services became more diverse. In 1993, white students accounted for just 42 percent of total K-12 enrollment, compared to 37 percent of Hispanic or Latino descent, 8 percent Asian, and 9 percent African American.[5]
除了饱受挣扎的经济之外，加州人口在之前几十年里飞速增长并几乎没有显示出放缓的迹象。自1970年以来，州内的人口增长了1千多万，使得1990年的总人口数达到将近3000万。[4] 由于1970年后主要来自拉丁美洲和亚洲国家的国际移民占据了州内新居民的大多数，人口潮也显著地改变了州内的人口结构组成。随着那些依靠公共服务的人口变得更多样化，该人口结构改变在全州都反映了出来。在1993年，白人学生只占了12年级注册学生中的42%，相比之下西班牙或拉丁后裔的比率为37%，亚洲裔为8%，而非裔美国人为9%。[5]
The combination of a slow economic recovery, especially for middle-class white males, and the perception that the state was being overrun by immigrants contributed to the drafting of the so-called “Save Our State” initiative, which would become Proposition 187 and placed on the 1994 ballot. Its provisions denied illegal alien children access to public schools and excluded illegal aliens from receiving virtually any other kind of public service or aid.[6] Having lagged in the polls for reelection due to poor economic conditions, Governor Pete Wilson championed of the lightning-rod issue, which enjoyed strong public support from the still mostly white electorate. He surged ahead to beat his democratic challenger Kathleen Brown with a convincing 55 to 40 percent defeat and Proposition 187 was approved by voters 59 to 41 percent.[7] Republicans across the state also performed well, picking up eight seats in the Assembly and three statewide office seats from the Democrats. The remarkable performance of conservative politicians and conservative ballot measures in the 1994 elections is often attributed to their success at tapping into the growing anxiety of white voters that their way of life was under threat by the massive influx of immigrants and changing demographics.[8] Many of the jobs lost in the manufacturing and housing sectors during the recession were occupied by middle-class white workers, and were thus less insulated from economic hardship than in previous economic contractions.[9]
缓慢的经济恢复（尤其对中产阶级白人男性而言），以及关于加州移民泛滥的看法两者组合促成了所谓的“拯救我们的州”发起草案，它成为187号法案并被放进了1994年的投票选举里。其条款否定了非法移民儿童进入公立学校的资格，并让非法移民几乎无法接受任何其它类型的公共服务或救助。[6] 因为差劲的经济形势而在连任的民意调查里处于落后位置，州长Pete Wilson倡导了这个易受攻击的问题，该问题得到了当时大多数仍是白人选民的大力支持。他取得了领先，以55%对40%确凿的优势击败了民主党挑战者Kathleen Brown，而187号法案由选民以59%对41%批准。[7] 全州共和党人的表现也不错，在议会里获得了8席并从民主党那里夺取了3个州级政府办公室席位。保守派政客和保守的选票措施在1994年大选中的出色表现通常被归因为他们成功地利用了白人选民日益增长的焦虑感，即他们的生活方式受到了大量涌入的移民和人口结构变化的威胁。[8] 经济衰退期间制造业和住房业里失去的许多工作都由中产阶级白人工人把持，因此和以前的经济紧缩相比，他们更容易受到经济困难的困扰。[9]
From the Ivory Tower to the Ballot
从常青藤象牙塔到投票选举
While racial politics dominated the political sphere of the early to mid-1990s, Glynn Custred and Thomas Wood, two Bay Area academics, were confronted with the state’s growing diversity firsthand. A professor of anthropology at the Hayward campus of California State University since 1970, Custred witnessed the demographic shifts on campus as Hayward began its push to become one of the most multicultural college campuses in America. In 1989, Hayward adopted policies that allowed minority and women candidates to apply directly for positions on the faculty without requiring a vacancy in the department. Custred saw the new policy as essentially adopting a quota for minority faculty, which he called racist.[10] He argued for his department to not take part, objecting that faculty should be hired solely on their competency and qualifications aside from minority status. Citing the 1964 Civil Rights Act, he concluded that there was nothing wrong with the law, which outlawed discrimination based on race, color, sex, religion or national origin; it was simply not being enforced. He eventually joined and later become Executive Director of the California Association of Scholars, the state chapter of the National Association of Scholars, which is a coalition of other academics who shared his views towards multiculturalism and affirmative action.
当种族政治主导了90年代早期至中期的政治界时，Glynn Custred和Thomas Wood这两位湾区的学者亲身面对了加州日益增长的多样性。Custred自1970年起就是加州州立大学海沃德分校的人类学教授，随着海沃德开始推进成为美国最多元文化的大学校区之一，他目睹了校园里的人口结构变化。在1989年，海沃德采用了政策，允许少数族裔族裔群体和女性候选人无需部门里有空缺就可以直接申请系里的职位。Custred认为新政策实质上对少数族裔族裔群体教职员采用配额，他称其为种族歧视。[10] 他争辩说他的部门不应参与其中，反对除了少数族裔族裔群体身份外仅凭能力和资格聘用教师。他引用了1964年民权法案，得出结论说法律没有问题，该法律宣布基于种族、肤色、性别、宗教或民族血统的歧视是非法的，只不过该法律没有得到执行。他最终加入了并日后成为加州学者协会的执行理事，该协会是全国学者协会在加州的分会，它是其他同意他在多元文化和平权行动上的观点的学者联盟。
Unlike Custred, Wood became interested in the topic of affirmative action policy as an applicant struggling to land a job with the philosophy department at San Francisco State University. He claims to have ran into a member of the search committee before he applied for the job, and was told that he would have been hired instead of a woman of color had it not been for the school’s affirmative action policy.[11]
和Custred不同，Wood在作为一名努力在旧金山州立大学哲学系里找工作的申请者时对平权行动政策话题产生了兴趣。他宣称在申请工作前曾遇到招聘委员会的一名成员，并被告知如果不是学校有平权行动政策，其实会聘用他而不是一位有肤色女性。[11]
Wood continued to take on research jobs while pursuing a permanent position until he came across the Supreme Court’s Bakke decision. In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978), Justice Powell, writing for the Court, concluded that the UC Davis Medical School’s policy of setting aside seats for minority students during the application process amounted to a racial quota and violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because students were split into two pools and considered separately.[12] Powell also said, however, that the university’s goal of creating a diverse student body was constitutionally permissible, and that race could be considered as a “plus factor” for an applicant. Wood disagreed entirely. He believed that including race in the decision process amounted to discrimination against those not of minority status and concluded that his inability to land a job in academia was a result of affirmative action.[12] He called the National Association of Scholars to see if they had a local chapter, and by the end of 1991 had become friends with Custred.
Wood在努力追求永久职位的同时继续从事研究工作直到他得知了最高法院的Bakke裁决。在加州大学董事会诉Bakke案（1978年）里，为法院裁决执笔的大法官Powell做出结论，加州大学Davis医学院在申请过程中为少数族裔族裔群体学生留出席位的政策造成了种族配额并违反了第14条宪法修正案的平等保护条款，因为学生被划分成两组并被分别对待。[12] Powell还说，不过大学产生多样化学生族裔族裔群体的目标在宪法上是被允许的，并且种族可以被看作是申请者的“加分因素”。Wood对此完全不同意。他相信把种族因素包括进作决定过程里是针对那些非少数族裔群体的歧视，并下结论他无法在学院里找到工作是平权行动的结果。[12] 他打电话问全国学者协会是否有本地分会，而到1991年底已经和 Custred成为朋友。
Inspired by the success of recent ballot initiatives, the two began drafting a constitutional amendment of their own in 1992, which they titled the California Civil Rights Initiative (CCRI). According to Custred and Wood, the purpose was simply to reaffirm the principle in the Civil Rights Act of 1964: non-discrimination means your race or gender cannot factor into how you are treated when it comes to contract, employment, and admissions decisions — even if you are white.[13] Drawing on their backgrounds in research, the two began to investigate the issue in depth, paying close attention to the language surrounding affirmative action and public opinion polling data. Their findings were striking. Support for affirmative action programs fluctuated massively depending on the wording of the question. One poll found that when asked if they would support affirmative action, provided no quota system was used, 75 percent of respondents were in favor, including 71 percent among whites. However, when asked if they would support a system of racial preference for minorities over equally qualified white candidates, 72 percent of white respondents and 42 percent of black respondents answered negatively.[14] This discovery was a breakthrough for Custred and Wood. First, it suggested that many Americans may actually be less supportive of affirmative action than previously thought because not everyone actually knew that it entailed preferential treatment based on race. Second, knowing that support plummeted when affirmative action was presented as a racial preference provided the perfect blueprint for how to frame the issue for the initiative and the campaign. Instead of attacking affirmative action head on, Custred and Wood could attack the much less attractive concept of racial preference for minorities.
受到最近投票选举动议成功的启发，他们两人在1992年开始起草自己的宪法修正案，他们将其冠名为加州民权动议（CCRI）。据Custred和Wood称，其目的只不过是重申1964年民权法案的原则：不歧视意味着你在合同、雇佣和录取决定方面受到的待遇不能把你的种族或性别考虑进去——即使你是白人也不行。[13] 利用他们的研究背景，两人开始深度调查该问题，密切注意围绕平权行动的用词和公众观点民意调查数据。他们的发现非常惊人。对平权行动计划的支持根据问题的措辞有大幅度的波动。一项民意调查发现当在不使用配额系统的情况下询问是否会支持平权行动时，75%的调查对象表示支持，其中包括白人中的71%。然而当问到他们是否会支持比起同等资格的白人对少数族裔候选人给予种族优待的系统时，72%的白人调查对象和42%的黑人调查对象给出了负面答案。[14] 这个发现对Custred和Wood来说是个突破。首先，这表明和之前的看法相比许多美国人可能实际上不那么支持平权行动，因为不是所有人都真的知道它包含了基于种族的优先待遇。其次，知道把平权行动作为种族偏向时支持率暴跌了，这为如何为倡议和运动定义该问题提供了理想的蓝图。与其正面攻击平权行动，Custred和Wood可以攻击对少数族裔群体的种族偏向这个吸引力低得多的概念。
Without the support of either political party, and still lacking key connections to fundraising, the initiative failed to gather enough signatures to qualify for the 1994 ballot. However, the issue caught fire in the wake of the November election, in large part due to Custred and Wood’s capitalizing on the divisive language surrounding Proposition 187 driven by Governor Wilson.[15] They formed a committee with Larry Arnn, the President of the Claremont Institute, as Chairman. Other well-connected conservatives flocked to the cause, including Los Angeles based Republican pollster Arnold Steinberg, who would later lead the campaign, and William Rusher, the founder and Publisher of the National Review. With campaign staff assembled, the group began work on drumming up sources of funding.[16]
没有两党中任何一方的支持以及仍然缺少取得筹款所需的关键关系，倡议未能收集到足够的签名以获得进入1994投票选举的资格。然而，紧随着11月大选，这个问题引起了关注，很大程度上是因为Custred和Wood利用了围绕由州长Wilson推动的187号法案的分歧性用语。[15] 他们和克莱蒙研究所的所长Larry Arnn成立了一个委员会，由Larry Arnn任主席。其他人脉广泛的保守派蜂拥至该事业上，其中包括位于洛杉矶的共和党民意调查专家Arnold Steinberg，他日后将领导该运动，以及国家评论的创始人以及出版商William Rusher。组建好了运动工作人员，这个小组开始竭力争取资金来源。[16]
Gaining Momentum
势头增强
While Custred and Wood had been engaged in laying the theoretical framework for the fight against affirmative action, Governor Wilson had enlisted the help of a longtime friend, Ward Connerly, to lead the charge. Connerly became friends with Wilson in the late 1960s and was asked by Wilson to join the Assembly Committee on Urban Affairs and Housing.[16] Wilson eventually convinced him to join the private sector, where his firm was successful consulting on public development projects. In 1993, Wilson appointed Connerly to the UC Board of Regents where he quickly gained a reputation of an active and thoughtful member. Through Wilson, Connerly met with Jerry and Ellen Cook, whose son had been rejected from medical school, where Cook presented evidence that white and Asian students were being denied admission to California schools despite having better grades and test scores than Latino and black students who were admitted.[17] Connerly concluded that the affirmative action policies of the state schools amounted to racial discrimination, and began his campaign as regent to stop the process.
在Custred和Wood忙于为反对平权行动之战铺好理论框架时，州长Wilson谋取了旧交Ward Connerly的帮助来带头冲锋。Connerly在60年代晚期和Wilson成为朋友，并且Wilson让他加入城市事务及住房议会委员会。[16] Wilson最终说服了他加入私企，他的公司在为公共开发项目提供咨询上做得很成功。在1993年，Wilson任命Connerly加入加州大学董事会，作为一名活跃而有思想的成员，他很快赢得了声望。通过Wilson，Connerly遇到了Jerry和Ellen Cook，这两人的儿子被医学院拒绝了，Cook拿出了证据说尽管白人和亚裔学生的成绩和考试得分比被录取的拉丁裔和黑人学生好，但是他们被加州的学校拒绝录取。[17] Connerly得出结论，州立学校的平权行动政策构成了种族歧视，并以委员的身份开始他的运动以制止这一过程。
Wilson, who had selected affirmative action as the next issue divisive enough to attract white voters to his campaign and rally public support, encouraged Connerly’s efforts. His mission attracted special attention due to his being African American, which some suggest was why Wilson had selected him for the position.17 Connerly admitted that even though it was never explicitly mentioned, the presence of a charismatic and intelligent black man leading the charge against affirmative action neutralized potential attacks from opponents that animus towards minorities motivated the campaign.[18]
Wilson选择了平权行动作为分歧足够严重的下一个问题以吸引白人选民到他的运动并争取公众支持，他对Connerly的努力加以鼓励。因为是非裔美国人，他的行动吸引了特别关注，一些人认为这是Wilson为什么选他担任这个职位的原因。17 Connerly承认尽管从未明确提及，一位有超凡魅力和聪明才智的、带领反抗平权行动的黑人的存在抵消了反对派的潜在攻击，即发起者因为对少数族裔群体的敌意激发了该运动。[18]
On July 20th, 1995, Connerly and Wilson took their campaign against affirmative action to the UC Board of Regents meeting where they were met by Rev. Jesse Jackson and civil rights organizers protesting. Wilson played hardball, ensuring the protesters had minimal effect and allowing Connerly to forcefully present his case calling for the end of affirmative action in the UC system which was first approved by the board in 1975.20 Connerly and Wilson were successful and the regents voted 15-10 to end affirmative action in hiring and 14-10 to end affirmative action in admissions decisions. Despite the UC Academic Senate voting 124-2 to ask Regents to rescind their votes, the policy was upheld and Wilson’s polling soared, especially among white voters. [19]
1995年7月20日，Connerly和Wilson把他们反对平权行动之运动带到了加州大学董事会会议上，在那里他们遇到Jesse Jackson牧师和民权组织者抗议。Wilson采取了强硬手段，确保抗议者影响在最小程度，并允许Connerly强有力地陈述自己的案例，要求终止加州大学系统里的由董事会于1975年首次批准的平权行动。20 Connerly和Wilson取得了成功，委员们以15对10的投票通过终止了招聘过程中的平权行动，以及14对10的投票通过终止了录取决定里的平权行动。尽管加州大学学术评议会以124对2投票通过要求董事会撤销他们的投票，该政策继续维持，而Wilson在民意调查中的位置急剧上升，尤其是在白人选民当中。[19]
Just over one month later, CCRI filed for a spot on the 1996 ballot. The campaign immediately benefitted from the heightened publicity stirred up by Connerly and Wilson as it raced to meet the signature requirement of nearly 700,000 signatures.[20]
仅仅过了一个月后，CCRI申请在1996投票中占有一席之位。该运动立即得益于Connerly和 Wilson作出的大力宣传，同时它竭力争取达到将近700,000个签名的要求。[20]
Filing for the second time, Custred and Wood were eager to keep the phrase “affirmative action” out of the ballot title and summary due to its higher favorability among voters. They met with Chief Deputy Attorney General David Stirling to ensure that no mistakes were made the summary reflected the language of the measure.[21] In December of 1995, Connerly was asked to join the campaign as the Chairman. Shortly after, Wilson’s fundraising with the California Republican party provided a much-needed donation of $500k to resume collecting signatures to qualify the measure. Just two months later in February of 1996, the campaign turned in over a million signatures and qualified for the 1996 ballot as Proposition 209.[21]
第二次申请时，Custred和Wood渴望将“平权行动”这个词组排除在投票选举标题和摘要之外，这是因为其在选民中有更高的支持。他们和首席副司法部长David Stirling会面以确保没有犯错误，即摘要反映了措施的语言。[21] 1995年12月，Connerly被要求以主席的身份加入运动。不久之后，Wilson从加州共和党那里获取的筹款提供了急需的50万美元捐赠来恢复收集签名以使该措施取得资格。就在两个月后的1996年2月，运动提交了超过1百万个签名并作为209号法案取得资格进入1996年投票选举。[21]
Republican Attorney General Dan Lungren was in charge of preparing the ballot summaries, which are crucial to informing voters as they are likely the only non-partisan information they will see before voting. [21] State law requires that summaries be impartial, but Lungren was outspoken about supporting the proposition and even signed one of the rebuttals in favor in the voter’s guide.[22] Titled Proposition 209: “Prohibition Against Discrimination or Preferential Treatment by State and Other Public Entities”, the summary text read:
共和党派司法部长Dan Lungren负责准备投票摘要，它们对告知选民至关重要，因为它们很可能是投票前选民能看到的唯一非偏党派信息。[21] 州法律要求摘要公正中立，但Lungren公开宣布了支持该法案，甚至在选民指南中签署了一项反对声明，以表示支持。[22] 209号法案标题为：“禁止州级和其他公共机构实施的歧视或优先待遇”，摘要文字是这样写的：
“Prohibits the state, local governments, districts, public universities, colleges, and schools, and other government instrumentalities from discriminating against or giving preferential treatment to any individual or group in public employment, public education or public contracting on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin.”[23]
“禁止州、地方政府、区、公立大学、学院和学校以及其他政府机构在公务雇用、公共教育或公共承包方面基于种族、性别、肤色、族群或民族血统歧视或提供优先待遇给任何个人或族裔群体。”[23]
When the summary was published in July, the opposition campaign was furious that the summary made no mention of affirmative action and took Lungren to court. [22] Sacramento Superior Court Judge James Ford sided with the opposition and made Lungren rewrite the summary as it was clearly biased. Nevertheless, Lungren appealed and the Third District Court in Sacramento overturned Ford’s decision, stating: “The title and summary inform the public of the general purpose of the measure.”[24] This marked a monumental win for the campaign as, according to an LA Times poll in September, 59 percent of voters did not understand that Prop. 209 would effectively end affirmative action.[25] Read without qualification, the measure enjoyed 70 percent support.[26]
当摘要于7月公布时，反对派运动对摘要没提及平权运动感到十分愤怒，并把Lungren告上法庭。[22] 萨克拉门托高等法院法官James Ford站在反对派一边，让Lungren重写了摘要，因为它明显有偏见。然而Lungren进行了上诉，而萨卡拉门托的第三地区法院撤销了Ford的判决，表示：“该标题和摘要告知了公众该措施的一般用途。”[24] 这对运动来说标志着巨大的成功，据9月的洛杉矶时报民意调查显示，59%的选民不明白209号法案实际上会终止平权行动。[25] 无条件地阅读后，该措施获得了70%的支持。[26]
The 209 campaign continued to lead in the polls until Election Day, bolstered by their advertising that emphasized equal opportunity and color-blindness. Featuring Connerly in a soft, moral and unifying tone, the first radio ad highlighted his support for the issue as an African American and ended with the wholesome catchphrase: “Equal opportunity without quotas. Yes! Proposition 209. Bring us together.”[27] Another ad featured a young white woman who claimed to be the victim of reverse discrimination after being removed from a remedial English class intended for minority students.[28] Instead of adopting the severe language surrounding the Proposition 187 campaign, the emphasis of an inclusive campaign predicated on fairness and equal opportunity resonated with voters, particularly white voters. Proposition 209 ultimately passed with 55.5 percent of the vote.[29] According to the LA Times exit polls, 63 percent of white voters supported the measure while 74 percent of African Americans, 76 percent of Latinos and 61 percent of Asians voted against.[30]
209运动继续在民意调查中领先直到大选日，由其强调平等机会和不看肤色的宣传加以增强。首个电台广告以柔和、道德和统一的语气表现了Connerly，强调了他作为非裔美国人对这个问题的支持并以有良好影响的口号结尾：“没有配额的平等机会。是的！209号法案。把我们汇聚在一起。”[27] 另一个广告展示了一位年轻的白人女性，她宣称在被专门面向少数族裔群体学生的英语补习班移除后成为反向歧视的受害者。[28] 与其采用围绕187号法案运动的严厉措辞，强调公平和平等机会的包容性运动引起了选民的共鸣，尤其是白人选民。209号法案最终以55.5%的选票得以通过。[29] 据洛杉矶时报投票后民意调查显示，63%的白人选民支持了该措施，而74%的非裔美国人、76%的拉丁裔和61%的亚裔投票反对。[30]
A Better Path for the Opposition
反对的更好途径
A ragtag coalition of civil rights groups, women’s advocacy organizations, and grassroots organizers, the opposition campaign faced a long, uphill battle to defeating Prop. 209. Unlike their adversaries, the opposition did not enjoy the support of the political party that closely aligns with their interests and constituents. Outmatched in terms of fundraising, the proponents were able to conduct an ad campaign that dominated the radio waves and television stations without a proper response from the opponents. Opponents also did not benefit from sympathetic elected officials in positions capable of shaping the outcome in the way that Governor Wilson and Attorney General Lungren assisted the proponents. Nevertheless, despite all of these hurdles, the most significant obstacle was the simple and deceiving language of the measure that confused many voters. According to exit polls, a majority — 54 percent — of voters supported affirmative action programs, yet nearly the same number also voted in favor of Prop. 209, ending programs that they likely supported.[31]
反对运动是民权族裔群体、妇女倡导组织和草根组织者的散漫联盟，它在击败209号法案上面临着漫长而艰难的斗争。不像其对手，反对派没有受到与他们的利益和选民密切相一致的政党的支持。支持者在筹款上胜出，他们能够开展一场主导电台和电视台的宣传活动，而没有收到反对派的适当回应。反对派也没有从有同情心的当选官员那里受益，这些官员能够像州长Wilson和司法部长Lungren协助支持者那样有能力改变结果。然而，尽管有着所有这些障碍，最大的障碍是该措施的简单且具有欺骗性语言，它使很多选民感到疑惑。据投票后民意调查显示，大多数选民——其中的54%——支持了平权行动计划，但几乎相同数目的选民也投票支持了209号法案，终止了他们很可能支持的计划。[31]
To successfully defeat Prop. 209 would require a campaign that effectively combated the ambiguity surrounding the issue of affirmative action while still providing enough of impetus to mobilize minority voter support. The best way to achieve this would be through an alternative ballot initiative, a tactic that the opposition attempted but failed to capitalize on.[32] Over nearly six months, activists in the Bay Area organized a group of lawyers to draft an alternative amendment, eventually settling on the Equal Opportunities Without Quotas initiative after producing hundreds of drafts. The amendment explicitly prohibited racial quotas, the hiring of unqualified applicants, and threatened fines for anyone who fraudulently benefited from affirmative action programs. [33] Essentially, the initiative reaffirmed the current standards of acceptable affirmative action practices as decided by the Supreme Court. The same length as Prop. 209 and with broadly appealing language, it was sent in to the Legislative Analyst’s Office for review as their best hope. Nine months of hard work were immediately dashed, however, when the analyst concluded that the state’s enrichment programs targeted at minority students qualified as a racial quota. Dismantling these programs as a result would alienate far too many voters and potential donors, but it was too late to appeal the decision and the campaign had to quickly change direction to defeating Prop. 209 flat out. [33] If there had been less infighting between members of the coalition and it was decided earlier to pursue an alternative amendment, there would have been time to petition the analyst for reconsideration or to revise the measure until it did not produce the same unintended consequences.
要想成功地击败209号法案需要一个有效地与围绕平权行动问题的歧义搏斗同时仍然提供足够动力调动少数族裔群体选民支持的运动。达成这一目的的最好方法是通过替代投票选举倡议，反对派尝试过这个策略但未能从中获利。[32] 在接下来的将近6个月里，湾区的积极分子组织了一群律师起草替代修正案，在写出了数百份草稿后最终定为“没有配额的平等机会”倡议。该修正案明确禁止种族配额、雇用不合格的申请者，并且威胁对以欺诈性质从平权运动计划中得益的任何人进行罚款。[33] 实质上，该倡议重申了由最高法院裁决的被大家认可的平权运动做法的现行标准。它和209号法案长度相同，并有着有广泛吸引力的用语，作为他们最大的希望，它被送到立法分析办公室进行复审。然而，当分析员得出结论说州里针对少数族裔群体学生的强化项目算作种族配额时，9个月的辛勤工作立即破灭了。由此解散这些项目会疏远太多的选民和潜在捐款人，然而申诉该决定已为时过晚，运动需要迅速改变方向以击败209号法案。[33] 如果联盟成员间没有那么多内斗，并且早做决定寻求替代修正案，原本会有时间请求分析员重新考虑或修改该措施直到它不造成同样的意料之外的后果。
The alternative ballot initiative competing directly with Prop. 209 would force voters to choose between two pitches for fairness and equal opportunity. Instead of being presented with a single initiative condemning racial preference and promising to restore fairness to employment and admission decisions, the voter would be presented with an alternative that appeals to the same sensibilities but would be able to invoke the language of affirmative action, which had a significantly higher favorability rating according to the polls. It could even capitalize on the aversion of voters towards quotas by prohibiting them. Likewise, it could assuage the fears of white voters that unqualified candidates could take positions they did not deserve by explicitly prohibiting that practice as well. The biggest underlying problem with Prop. 209, which was illustrated by the number of voters who say they supported affirmative action but nevertheless voted against it, is that voters did not have a clear picture of what affirmative action actually entailed.[33] The opposition campaign fought to explain the history of prejudice, which pushed economic and academic opportunities out of reach for many people of color and women, and described how affirmative action works to correct these patterns of discrimination. This nuanced argument, however, does not fit neatly into a 30 second radio or television ad. The opposition needed a shorter, more palatable appeal for fairness.
与209号法案直接竞争的替代投票选举倡议会强迫选民从两个公平和平等机会的点子中选一个。与其提出一个谴责种族偏向并承诺恢复雇用和录取决定上的公平的单一倡议，不如向选民提出一个诉诸相同感性但能够援引平权行动语言的替代方案，据民意调查显示平权行动有显著的更高支持率。它甚至还能通过禁止配额而充分利用选民对其的厌恶。同样的，它还能通过明确禁止不合格的申请者能得到他们不配得到的职位这一做法而减轻白人选民的担忧。209号法案最大的底层问题，即由表示他们支持平权行动但还是投票反对它的选民数表明了出来，是选民不清楚平权行动究竟包含了什么。[33] 反对运动费了很大劲解释了偏见的历史，这段历史使得许多有色人群和女性无法触及经济和学术上的机会，它还描述了平权行动如何能改正这些歧视方式。然而这个微妙的争辩没有很好地放入30秒的电台或电视广告。反对派需要较短的、更可接受的呼吁以求公平。
On top of cutting through some of the confusion surrounding the issue, an alternative initiative would have shaped the down the road campaign greatly. The language and substance of the initiative aligned closely with President Bill Clinton’s “mend it, don’t end it” stance towards affirmative action, and would likely have engaged the Democratic Party and the President himself in the campaign. Instead, Clinton kept the issue at arms-length, as he did not want to alienate too many white voters by staunchly supporting affirmative action.[34] Likewise, the priorities of the Democratic Party were clear. They were not going to jeopardize Clinton’s reelection for the sake of a state proposition, even if it did align closely with their policy positions and constituents. However, if the campaign offered a positive account that both the Democratic Party and President could get behind, they would have enjoyed significantly larger contributions to their war chest, which could then be used to wage a proper media campaign. Proponents of the alternative measure could then match Connerly’s soft-spoken testimony with countless cases of minorities and women who have benefited from affirmative action. Simultaneously, these ads would appeal to white voters by reaffirming the prohibition on quotas and unqualified applicants benefiting from the program. Ultimately, a competing initiative offered the best chance of success in defeating Prop. 209, as it would broaden the coalition of support to include more donors and high profile voices, as well as enable the opposition to frame the issue in their own terms.
在澄清围绕该问题的一些疑惑之外，替代倡议本可以极大地塑造运动的未来之路。倡议的用语和实质与Bill Clinton总统对于平权行动的”修补它，不要终止它“的立场密切相一致，本来很有可能吸引民主党和总统本人参与运动。但是Clinton和该问题保持了距离，因为他不想因坚定地支持平权行动而疏远太多白人选民。[34] 同样的，民主党的首要事项是很明确的。他们不会为了一项州级法案而损害Clinton的连任，即使它的确与他们的政治立场和选民密切相一致。然而如果运动提供了民主党和总统都可以支持的积极口号，那么他们本来可以添加多得多的资金到竞选运动基金里，这之后能被用于开展一次像样的媒体运动。替代措施的支持者就能用无数从平权运动中得益的少数族裔群体和女性的案例匹配Connerly柔和的证词。与此同时，这些广告能通过重申禁止配额以及从计划中得益的不合格申请者而吸引白人选民。最终，一个有竞争力的倡议提供击败209号法案的最佳成功机会，因为它能扩大支持联盟，包括进更多捐款者和知名度高的声音，还能使反对派以自己的方式定义该问题。
Conclusion
结论
In his first Inaugural Address in 1911, Governor of California Hiram Johnson extolled the virtues of direct democracy and its unique ability to return the power of governance back to the people from the hands of corrupt political parties and special interests.[35] Nevertheless, the creation of the initiative process also opened the door to popular referendums on key civil rights policy, including affirmative action. The events of 1996 attest to Johnson’s claim that average citizens, if sufficiently driven and politically minded, can impose their will over objections in the political establishment by using direct democracy. At the same time, however, the campaign raised new questions about the role of popular consensus in the domain of civil rights. Throughout the campaign, average voters lacked information about the issues, specifically about what affirmative policies actually entail when choosing candidates for a limited number of vacancies. This issue was further compounded by the use of deceptive and ambiguous language by proponent’s campaign. Ultimately, California’s battle over affirmative action highlights the inadequacies of direct democracy when dealing with complex policy issues that intersect with civil rights. Further, the campaign orchestrated by Wood and Custred, and led by Connelly, demonstrated the importance of controlling the narrative surrounding a political issue. By tapping into economic and racial anxieties at the right time, the campaign exposed the dire need for an informed and engaged citizenry for a system of direct democracy to function.
在其1911年的首次就职演说里，加州州长Hiram Johnson赞美了直接民主制的长处和其独特能力，即能把监管力量从腐败的政党和特别利益的手中还给人民。[35] 然而，倡议过程的产生也打开了通向在关键民权政策（包括平权行动）上进行全民公投的大门。1996年的事件证明了Johnson的断言，即普通公民，即使受到了足够的驱动并有政治头脑，可以通过使用直接民主把自己的意愿强加于政治体制里的反对之上。不过在此同时，运动提出了关于民权领域里全民意识的角色的新问题。在整个运动期间，在为有限的空缺职位选择候选人时普通选民缺少关于问题的信息，特别是关于平权政策究竟包含了什么的信息。支持者的运动对欺骗性和有歧义的语言的使用使问题进一步恶化。最终，加州的平权行动之战突出了直接民主制在处理和民权有交叉的复杂政治问题时的不足性。更进一步，由Wood和Custred策划并由Connelly领导的运动显示了控制围绕政治问题的叙述的重要性。通过在正确时刻利用了经济和种族方面的焦虑感，运动暴露了对有见识以及有参与性的公民的迫切需要，以使直接民主制系统能发挥职能。
备注
[1] The California economy in 1990s. Legislative Analyst’s Office. [2] Bureau of Labor Statistics. Local area unemployment statistics: Statewide, California. 1990-1998. [3] The California economy in 1990s. Legislative Analyst’s Office. [4] Jack Citrin. 2013. State of change: Immigration politics and the new demography of California. 31-33. [5] Educational Demographics Unit. Statewide enrollment by ethnicity, 1993-1994. [6] Peter Schrag. 1998. Paradise lost: California’s experience, America’s future. 228-231. [7] Summary of votes cast for state offices: November 8, 1994. [8] Peter Schrag, 230-234. [9] Lydia Chávez. 1998. The color bind: California’s battle to end affirmative action. Berkeley: University of California Press. 31. [10] Lydia Chávez. 9-13. [11] Lydia Chávez. 13-16. [12] Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 US 265 (1978). [13] Lydia Chávez. 18-20. [14] John Brennan. “Key words influence stands on minorities.” [15] Cathleen Decker. “Affirmative action: Why battle erupted”. [16] Lydia Chávez. 25-29. [17] Lydia Chávez. 32-33. [18] Ward Connerly. “Affirmative action and proposition 209”. The California Republic. 258. [19] Lydia Chávez. 61-67. [20] Lydia Chávez. 67-69. [21] Lydia Chávez. 144-145. [22] Daniel Lungren, Quentin Kopp, and Gail Heriot. 1996. Rebuttal to argument against of proposition 209. [23] Proposition 209: Text of proposed law. 1996. [24] Lydia Chávez. 145. [25] Bettina Boxall. “A political battle grinds on as a war of wording”. [26] Lydia Chávez. 154. [27] Lydia Chávez. 188. [28] Lydia Chávez. 215. [29] Statement of vote: Votes for and against November 5, 1996 statewide ballot measures [30] State propositions: A snapshot of voters. [31] Lydia Chávez. 237. [32] Lydia Chávez. 105-108. [33] Bettina Boxall. “A political battle grinds on as a war of wording”. [34] Lydia Chávez. 223. [35] Hiram Johnson. First Inaugural Address.About Us
